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Creating Markets for NewVaccines
Part I: Rationale
Michael Kremer, Harvard University,The Brookings Institution, and NBER
Executive Summary
Malaria, tuberculosis, and the strainsof HW common in Africa killapproxi-
mately five million people eachyear. Yet research on vaccines for these diseases
remains minimallargely becausepotential vaccine developers fear that they
would not be able to sell enough vaccineat a sufficient price to recoup theirre- search expenditures.
Enhancing markets for new vaccinescould create incentives for vaccinere-
search and increase accessibility ofany vaccines developed. For example, the
President of the World Bank hasproposed establishing a fund to help develop-
ing countries finance purchases ofspecified vaccines if they are invented. The
U.S. administration's 2000 budgetproposal includes a tax credit fornew vac-
cines that would match each dollar ofvaccine sales with a dollar of tax credits.
This paper examines the rationale forsuch proposals.
Private firms currently conduct littleresearch on vaccines against malaria,
tuberculosis, and the strains of HIVcommon in Africa. This is not only because
these diseases primarily affectpoor countries, but also because vaccinesare
subject to severe market failures. Oncevaccine developers have invested in de-
veloping vaccines, governmentsare tempted to use their powers as regulators,
major purchasers, and arbiters of intellectualproperty rights to force prices to
levels that do not cover researchcosts. Research on vaccines is an international
public good, and none of themany small countries that would benefit froma
malaria, tuberculosis, or HJV vaccinehas an incentive to encourage researchby
unilaterally offering to pay higher prices.In fact, most vaccines sold in devel-
oping countries are priced at penniesper dose, a tiny fraction of their social
value. More expensive, on-patentvaccines are typically not purchased bythe
poorest countries. Hence, private developers lackincentives to pursue socially
valuable research opportunities. Largepublic purchases could potentiallyen-
large the market for vaccines, benefitingboth vaccine producers and the public at large.
Government-directed researchprograms may be well suited for basicre- search, but for the later,more applied stages of research, committingto com-
pensate successful private vaccine developershas important advantages. Un-
der such programs, the publicpays only if a successful vaccine is actuallyKremer
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developed. This gives pharmaceutical firmsand scientists strong incentives to
self-select research projects that have areasonable chance of leading to a vac-
cine, and to focus on developing aviable vaccine rather than pursuingother
goals.
Committing to purchase vaccinesand make them available to poorcountries
may be attractive relativeto other ways of rewardingvaccine developers. Ex-
tending patents on other pharmaceuticalsto reward developers of new vac-
cines would place the entireburden of financing vaccines on thoseneeding
these other pharmaceuticals. Increasingprices for current vaccines without ex-
plicit incentives for developmentof new vaccines would beinsufficient to spur
new research.
I.Introduction
Malaria, tuberculosis, and the strainsof HIV prevalent in Africa kill al-
most five million peopleeach year. Yet relative to this enormousbur-
den, very little vaccineresearch is directed toward thesediseases.
Potential vaccine developers fearthat they would not be able tosell
enough vaccine at a high enoughprice to recoup their researchinvest-
ments. This is both becausethese diseases primarily affect poor coun-
tries, and because vaccinemarkets are severely distorted.This paper
examines the economic rationalefor committing in advance to pur-
chase vaccines for these diseases.Such commitments could createin-
centives for vaccine researchand help ensure that if vaccines were
developed, poor countries couldafford them. Because a vaccine pur-
chase commitment wouldrequire no funds until a vaccine wasavail-
able, it would not competewith budgets for current efforts tocontrol
diseases using existing technology
These issues are particularlytimely The u.s. administration's
budget proposal(availableathttp:/ /www.treas.gOV/taXP01icY/
library/grnbk00.Pdf) includes $1 billionin tax credits over the
2002-2010 period for vaccine sales.The program would match every
dollar of qualifying vaccine saleswith a dollar of tax credit,effectively
doubling the incentive to developvaccines for neglected diseases.
Qualifying vaccines would have to coverinfectious diseases which kill
at least one million peopleeach year, would have to beapproved by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration(FDA), and would have to be
certified by the Secretary of theTreasury after advice from theU.S.
Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID). To qualify forthe tax
credit, sales would have to be made toapproved purchasing institu-
tions, such as the unitedNations Children's Fund(UNICEF). Al-New Vaccine Markets I: Rationale
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though the administration'sproposal is structured as a tax credit,it
would have effects similar toan expenditure program that matched
private funds spent on vaccines.
The World Bank president, JamesWolfensohn, recently said that the
institution plans to createa $1 billion fund to help countries purchase
specified vaccines if and when theyare developed (Financial Times,
2000). Wolfensohn's proposalis being discussed within the Bankand
would have to be approved bythe Bank's board. One optionunder
consideration is a more generalprogram to combat communicable dis-
eases of the poor. For a generalprogram to stimulate research, it must
include an explicit commitmentto help finance the purchase ofnew
vaccines if and when theyare developed. Without an explicit commit-
ment along the lines proposed by Wolfensohn,it is unlikely that the
large scale investments neededto develop vaccines will be undertaken.
The concept of a vaccine purchasefund has also receivedsupport
from European politicalleaders (http://www.auswartjges.amtde
1999, DFID 2000).
Section II of this paper provides backgroundinformation on malaria,
HJV, and tuberculosis; discussesthe prospects for vaccines forthese
diseases; and reviews thecurrent state of scientificprogress toward
vaccine development.
Section III discusses distortionsin the market for vaccines andfor
vaccine research. People tend tounderconsume vaccines fora number
of reasons. First, individuals haveinadequate incentives to takevac-
cines, since those who take vaccinesnot only benefit themselves, but
also benefit others by breakingthe cycle of infection. Second, thechief
beneficiaries of vaccinationare often children, who cannot contractto
pay vaccine sellers the future earnings theywill reap if they takevac-
cines and stay healthy. Third,consumers are often more willing topay
for treatment than prevention,perhaps because it takes time for them
to learn about the effectiveness ofvaccines. Monopoly pricing further
limits access to patented vaccines.Perhaps because of these factors,
most countries purchase vaccines in bulkand distribute them at subsi-
dized rates. At appropriateprices, these large public purchasescould
potentially make both vaccine producersand the population at large
better off than they would beunder monopoly pricing by reducingthe
cost per dose and expanding the market.
Distortions in the market forvaccine research are evengreater than
those for vaccines themselves.Rough calculations suggest thatthesocial benefits of malaria, tuberculosis, orHIV vaccines may easily ex-
ceed the returns to a privatedeveloper by a factor of 10 or more, so vac-
cine developers will lackincentives to pursue sociallyvaluable
research opportunities. Researchincentives are too small in many
fields, but the situation isparticularly problematic for vaccinesand is
dire for vaccines against diseasesthat primarily affect poor countries.It
is often possible to designaround vaccine patents, and sincevaccines
are primarily sold togovernments, brand loyaltyprovides minimal
benefit to the original developer. Oncedevelopers have sunk resources
into developing vaccines,governments are often tempted to usetheir
powers as regulators,major purchasers, and arbitersof intellectual
property rights to obtain vaccinesat prices which coveronly manufac-
turing costs, not research costs.Since research and development on
vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis,and HIV is a global public goodthat
benefits many small countries, nosingle country has an incentive to en-
courage research byoffering higher prices, and hence manycountries
have historically provided little or nointellectual property rights pro-
tection to vaccines. Most vaccinessold in developing countriessell for
pennies per dose, and newer,on-patent, vaccines, which sellfor a dol-
lar or two per dose, do notreach the poorest countries. Crudecalcula-
tions suggest that a malariavaccine would be cost-effectiverelative to
other developing country health programsat $41 per person immu-
nized. The gap between the $41 atwhich a vaccine would be cost-effec-
tive and the $2 which thehistorical record suggests a vaccinedeveloper
would be lucky to obtain for avaccine implies that under currentinsti-
tutions, potential vaccinedevelopers would not have incentivesto pur-
sue socially valuableresearch opportunities.
Section IV examines the appropriateroles of "push" and "pull" pro-
grams in encouragingvaccine research and improving accessto vac-
cines once they are developed.Push programs pay for research inputs,
for example through grants toresearchers, while pull programs payfor
an actual vaccine.Push programs are well suited tofinancing basic re-
search, because it is importantthat the results of basicresearch are
quickly communicated to otherscientists. Grant-funded researchers
have incentives to publishquickly, while researchers with strong
financial incentives to develop a vaccinemight wish to withhold infor-
mation from competitors.Historically, however, governmentshave re-
lied heavily on push programs toencourage even the later, more
applied stages of vaccine development,in part because it was thought
Kremer
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necessary to finance research expenditures in advance ofthe develop-
ment of a vaccine. With the development of thebiotech industry and
the increased availability of finance fromventure capitalists and large
pharmaceutical firms, it is now much easierfor scientists to attract in-
vestors to finance research, as longas a substantial market is expected
for the product.
Pull programs can provide sucha market, and they have several
attractive features relative to traditional pushprograms for encourag-
ing the later stages of vaccine development.Under pull programs,
the public pays nothing unlessa viable vaccine is developed. This gives
researchers incentives to self-select projectswith a reasonable chance
of yielding a viable vaccine, rather thanto oversell their research
prospects to research administrators and the public.It allows politi-
cians and the public to be confident that theyare paying for an
actual vaccine, rather than supportinga vaccine-development effort
that might not be warranted scientifically.Pull programs alsopro-
vide strong financial incentives forresearchers to focus on develop-
ing a marketable vaccine, rather thanpursuing other goals, such
as publishing academic articles. Finally, pullprograms can help en-
sure that if vaccines are developed, they will reach thosewho need
them.
Section V compares a vaccine purchasecommitment program to
other pull programs designed to increaseincentives for vaccine re-
search. Rewarding vaccine developerswith extensions of patentson
other pharmaceuticals would inefficientlyand inequitably place the
entire burden of financing vaccine developmenton patients who need
these other pharmaceuticals. Cash prizes forresearch are economically
similar to a vaccine purchaseprogram, but provide a somewhat
weaker link between vaccine quality andthe compensation paid to
vaccine developers. They are also likelyto be politically less attractive
and therefore less credible to potentialvaccine developers. Encourag-
ing vaccine development throughresearch tournaments is likely to be
difficult, since there is no guarantee thata vaccine could be developed
within a fixed time period. While expandedpurchases and deliveries
of currently underutilized vaccines wouldbe highly cost-effective
health interventions in theirown right, such purchases are unlikelyon
their own to convince potential developersof vaccines for malaria, hi-
berculosis, or clades of H1Vcommon in Africa that historically fickle
international aid donors will provide fundsto purchase vaccines for40 Kremer
these diseases 10 or 15 years from now.Explicit purchase commitments
would also be needed.
A companion paper, "CreatingMarkets for New Vaccines: Part II:
Design Issues," discusses how commitmentsto purchase vaccines
could be structured.
This paper builds on previous literature.The idea of committing to
purchase vaccines was discussed in WHO1996 and was advocated by
a coalition of organizationscoordinated by the International AIDS Vac-
cine Initiative at the 1997 Denver G8summit. Since then, the idea has
been explored by the World BankAIDS Vaccine Task Force (World
Bank 1999,2000). Kremer and Sachs (1999)and Sachs (1999) have advo-
cated the establishment of a program inthe popular press. This paper
also draws on earlier work on vaccines,including Batson 1998, Dupuy
and Freidel 1990, Mercer ManagementConsulting 1998, and Milstien
and Batson 1994, and on the broaderacademic literature on research in-
centives,including Guell and Fischbaum 1995,Johnston and
Zeckhauser 1991, Lanjouw and Cockburn 1999,Lichtmann 1997, Rus-
sell 1998, Scotchmer 1999, Shavell and vanYpserle 1998, and Wright
1983.
This paper differs from some of the earlierwork mentioned in exam-
ining the case for commitments topurchase vaccines in light of the un-
derlying economic principles ofasymmetric information and time
consistency. In particular, this paper arguesthat information asymme-
tries between funders and researchers mayhamper programs that fund
researchers in advance. The time-inconsistentpreferences of govern-
ments imply that in the absenceof specific commitments general state-
ments of intent to purchase vaccineswill not be credible. This paper
also differs from earlier work in comparingcommitments to purchase
vaccines to other pull programs.
II.Background on Malaria, HIV, and Tuberculosis
This section reviews the burden of themajor infectious diseases, dis-
cusses scientific prospectsfor vaccines, and argues that current re-
search efforts are paltry relative to theburden these diseases impose.
The Burden of Malaria, HI V/AIDS, andTuberculosis
Estimates of the burden of infectious disease varywidely, but it is clear
that the burden is huge. The World HealthOrganization estimates thatNew Vaccine Markets I: Rationale
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each year there are 300 millionclinical cases of malaria and 1.1million
deaths from malaria. Almostall cases are in developingcountries, and
almost 90% are in Africa (WHO1999a). Malaria is particularly likelyto
kill children and pregnantwomen. Resistance is spreading to the major
drugs used for treating malariaand for providing short-termprotec-
tion to travelers (Cowman 1995).
Each year, approximately 1.9million people die from tuberculosis.
More than 98% of these deathsoccur in developing countries (WHO
1999a). However, withup to 17% of tuberculosis infections resistantto
all five major anti-tuberculardrugs, the spread of resistanceposes a
threat to developedas well as developing countries (WHO, 199Th).The
existing BCG vaccine, which is distributedwidely, provides short-term,
imperfect protection againsttuberculosis, but a more effectivevaccine,
providing longer-term protection,is 1acking.
More than 33 million peopleare infected with HIV worldwide,over
95% of whom live in developingcountries. In 1998, about 2.3 million
people died of AIDS, 80% of whomlived in sub-Saharan Africa. Ap-
proximately 5.8 million peoplewere newly infected, 70% of whom
were in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO l999a;UNAIDS 1998). New life-
extending HIV treatmentsare far too expensive for most individuals
and governments in low-incomecountries. Since people withcompro-
mised immune systemsare especially vulnerable to tuberculosis,the
spread of HIV is contributingto the spread of tuberculosis. Indeed,of
the 1.9 million people who dieannually from tuberculosis, 400,000are
infected with HIV.
The Potential for Vaccines
Vaccines have proven effectiveagainst many other infectious diseases,
and in the long run, theyare likely to be the most effective and sustain-
able way to fight malaria,tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS. Thepotential
of vaccines is illustratedmost vividly by the success of thesmallpox
vaccination program, which led to theeradication of the disease in the
1970s. About three-quarters of theworld's children receivea standard
package of cheap, off-patentvaccines through WHO's ExpandedPro-
gram on Immunization (EPI), and thesevaccines are estimated to save
3 million lives per year (Kim-Farley, 1992).2However, only a small frac-
tion of children in poorcountries receive newer vaccines, suchas the
Hczemophilus influenzae type b (Hib)vaccine, which are stillon patent
and hence more expensive.Kremer
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The Global Alliance for Vaccinesand Immunization (GAVI),with
major financing fromthe Gates Foundation, isundertaking a
large-scale effort to improveutilization of existing vaccines.This effort
is likely to raise coveragerates and save millionsof lives. Coverage
rates would likely befurther increased if effectivevaccines were avail-
able against malaria, tuberculosis, orHIV/AIDS, since governments
would then have greater incentivesto maintain their immunizationin-
frastructure, and parentswould have more incentive tobring their chil-
dren in for vaccination. Evenif malaria, tuberculosis, orHIV vaccines
only achieved the same coveragerates as the inexpensiveEPI vaccines,
they would still save millionsof lives.
The question of whether vaccines canbe developed against malaria,
tuberculosis, and HIV remains open,but there is reason to be optimis-
tic. A recent National Academyof Sciences report (1996)concludes that
the development of a malariavaccine is scientificallyfeasible. Candi-
date vaccines have beenshown to protect against malariain several ro-
dent and primate models.Moreover, the human immunesystem can be
primed against natural malariainfection. People who survivebeyond
childhood in malaria endemic areasobtain limited immunitywhich
protects them against severemalaria, although not againstparasitemia
and milder illness. Sincevaccines prime the immune systemby mim-
icking natural infection,vaccines may similarlyprovide protection
against severe disease.Recently, candidate vaccines havebeen shown
to induce protectionagainst tuberculosis infection inanimal models.
The example of the existingBCG vaccine suggests that thehuman im-
mune system can beprimed against tuberculosisinfection. A number
of candidate HIV vaccinesprotect monkeys againstinfection and in-
duce immune responses inhumans.
Nonetheless, formidablescientific and technologicalobstacles re-
main in the way of the developmentof malaria, tuberculosis, andHIV
vaccines. All three diseaseshave many variants and evolverapidly,
making it difficult to designvaccines which are effectiveagainst all
variants of the disease andwhich remain effective over time.
Recent advances inimmunology biochemistry andcloning have
given scientists new tools tounderstand the immune response tothese
diseases, find correlates ofprotection useful in testingwhether candi-
date vaccines are likely tosucceed, and develop betteranimal models.
Genetic sequencing of theorganisms causing tuberculosis,AIDS, and
malaria is either complete orfar advanced. This may helpscientists cre-New Vaccine Markets I: Rationale 43
ate vaccines that target many different antigens,and thus are more ef-
fective in the face of genetic diversity.
Current Vaccine Research
Despite the increasing scientific potential,current research on vaccines
for malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV ispaltry relative to the burden of
these diseases. According toa Weilcome Trust study, public and
nonprofit malaria research amountedto about $84 million in 1993
(Weilcome Trust 1996) with vaccine researchmaking up only a small
fraction of the total. The amount ofprivate sector spending on malaria
is unknown, but is generally consideredto be far lower than public
spending. Less is known about totalexpenditures on tuberculosisre-
search, but the United States NationalInstitutes of Health, one of the
world's leading funders of basic research,spends around $65 million
per year on tuberculosis research, compared with $2.7 billionon cancer
research (NIH 1999).
Applied AIDS research is overwhelminglyoriented toward treat-
ments which would be appropriate for people withAIDS in rich coun-
tries, rather than toward vaccinesappropriate for poorer countries. The
multi-drug treatments for HTVare not feasible for poor countries, since
they cost $lO,000-16,000a year (PhRMA 1999), require ongoing im-
mune monitoring, and need to be taken in perpetuityaccording to a
precise protocol. To the extent that vaccineresearch is conducted, it is
primarily oriented toward the HIV strainscommon in rich countries.
Most candidate HP! vaccines testedworldwide are based on dade E,
the strain of the virus most widespreadin the United States, Europe,
Australia, and Latin America, rather than theclades most common in
Africa, where two-thirds ofnew infections occur. It is uncertain
whether a vaccine developed forone dade would protect against other
clades.
More generally, little research is orientedtoward tropical diseases.
Pecoul et al. (1999) report that of the1,233 drugs licensed worldwide
between 1975 and 1997, only 13were for tropical diseases. Two of these
were modifications of existing medicines, twowere produced for the
U.S. military, and five came from veterinaryresearch. Only four were
developed by commercial pharmaceuticalfirms specifically for tropical
diseases of humans. (Note, however, thatthe definition of tropical dis-
ease used in their assessment was narrow, and thatmany of the other44
Kremer
drugs licensed in this period wereuseful in both developing and devel-
oped countries.)
III.Failures in the Markets for Vaccinesand Vaccine Research
One reason for the paucity ofresearch on vaccines for malaria, tubercu-
losis, and clades of HIV common inAfrica is simply that the countries
affected by these diseases are poor, andcannot afford to pay much for
vaccines. If this were the only reason,however, there would be no par-
ticular reason to target aid expenditures tovaccines or vaccine re-
search, rather than to other goodsneeded in poor countries, such as
food and shelter. In fact, however,distortions in the markets for vac-
cines lead them to be underconsumed evenrelative to the incomes of
the poor. Even more severe distortionsin the research market eliminate
incentives for private firms to conductvaccine research that would
be cost-effective for society as awhole, even by the stringent cost-
effectiveness standards used to evaluatehealth interventions in poor
countries.
The subsection titled Failures inthe Market for Vaccines argues that
vaccines are underconsumed andthat large public purchases can po-
tentially make both vaccine producersand consumers better off than
they would be under monopolypricing. The next subsection,titled
Failures in the Market for VaccineResearch, argues that under current
institutions, private returns toresearch are limited by the ease of de-
signing around patents and bytemptations for governments to hold
down vaccine prices once vaccineshave been developed. The third
subsection, titled Social vs. PrivateReturn: Some Quantitative Esti-
mates, reports a rough calculationsuggesting that vaccines would be
cost-effective health interventions for poorcountries at prices 10 or 20
times as much as vaccine developerscould hope to realize from their
work. Thus, under currentinstitutional arrangements, private devel-
opers will lackincentives to pursue socially valuableresearch
opportunities.
Failures in the Market for Vaccines
Vaccines are underconsumed for a varietyof reasons. First, individuals
who take vaccines not only benefitthemselves, but also help break the
chain of disease transmission, thusbenefiting the rest of the popula-New Vaccine Markets I: Rationale 45
tion. Individuals have no incentive to takethese external benefits into
account in deciding whether to be vaccinated.Second, the chief
beneficiaries of vaccines are often children.Even if the cost of vaccina-
tion is trivial relative to the extra futurewages children will earn if they
stay healthy, children cannot contract topay for vaccination out of
those future wages. Third,consumers seem much more willing to pay
for treatment than prevention. Manypotential consumers in develop-
ing countries are illiterate and place limitedcredence in official pro-
nouncements about the benefits of vaccination. Theymay wait to see
these benefits by observing what happensto neighbors who take vac-
cines. However, the benefits of vaccines, unlikethose of drugs for treat-
ing diseases, are difficult to see, since the benefitsof vaccines are not
evident until considerably after vaccinesare taken, and many people
who do not take vaccinesnever get sick.
Monopoly pricing of vaccines would exacerbateunderconsumption
of vaccines. This may explain whygovernments in the vast majority of
countries purchase vaccines and distribute themto the population ei-
ther free or at a highly subsidized price. Becausevaccine development
is expensive, but manufacturing additional dosesof vaccine is typically
cheap, large government purchasescan potentially make both vaccine
producers and the general public better off thanthey would be under
monopoly pricing to individuals. Thiscan be achieved by purchasing a
large quantity of the vaccine ata lower price per dose than under mo-
nopoly pricing to individuals. The vaccine developercan be made
better off if the total value of their sales (pricetimes quantity) is higher
than it would be under sales to individuals.Those consumers who
would have been willing topay the monopoly price are better off, as
long as the taxes they would haveto pay to finance government vac-
cine purchases are less than the monopolyprice. The consumers who
valued the vaccine at more than the productioncost but less than the
monopoly price can also be made better off,as long as the value they
place on the vaccine is greater than the increasein taxes necessary to
finance government purchases.
Figure 2.1 shows a situation in whichgovernment purchases can po-
tentially make everyone better off than undermonopoly pricing. The
downward sloping line shows the willingnessto pay of different po-
tential consumers for the vaccine, which dependson their income. The
lower horizontal line represents thecost of producing an additional
dose of the vaccine once the research costs have beenincurred and theMonopoly Price
Manufacturing Cost
Willingness to Pay
Fract ion of Population Vaccinated
Figure 2.1
factory has been built. A monopolistwifi choose a price to maximize
profits. Area A represents the surplus of revenue overmarginal manu-
facturing costs under monopoly pricing.These funds can be used to
cover the costs of researchand development on the vaccine, the costsof
building the factory, and any profits. Notethat many people who are
not wffling to buy the vaccine at themonopoly price would be willing
to pay more than the amount it costs toproduce an additional dose of
vaccine.
To see why large government purchasesthat expand the market and
bring down the average cost per dose maypotentially be able to make
everybody better off, suppose that the government agreesto pay the
vaccine manufacturer an amount equal tothe sum of areas A, B, C, and
D in exchange for enough vaccines forthe entire population. If these
purchases are funded by taxing people based ontheir income, with all
people who would have paid the monopolyprice paying just under
that price, and all other people paying just overthe actual production
cost,3 vaccine producers and the generalpublic will both be better off
than under monopoly pricing.4'5 Areas Dand E represent the social
benefit o the vaccine purchase program.
Note that while large governmentpurchases could potentially make
both consumers and producers better off,if governments force prices
too low, they risk making vaccinedevelopers worse off than under a
private market system, thus discouragingresearch.
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Failures in the Market for Vaccine Research
Economists have estimated that the social returns to research and
development are typically twice the returns to private developers
(Nadiri 1993; Mansfield et al.1977). Private developers therefore
lack incentives to pursue research on socially valuable projects. The
gap between private and social returns to research is likely to be
much greater for research on malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV vaccines
than in many other areas of applied research. This is because it is
often possible to design around vaccine patents and because govern-
ments are often tempted to use their powers as regulators and large
purchasers to hold down vaccine prices after firms have sunk their re-
search investments and developed a vaccine. Because vaccine research
is a global public good benefiting many small countries, no single
country has an incentive to pay higher vaccine prices to encourage re-
search.
It is often possible to design around vaccine patents, and this may
make it difficult for the original developers of new vaccines to recoup
their research expenditures. Once they have invested millions in a risky
effort to develop new vaccines, competitors may be able to slightly al-
ter their approach so as to develop a competing vaccine, driving down
prices. In many industries, first-mover advantages are often as impor-
tant as patents in spurring innovation. However, governments and
international organizations purchase most vaccines, and these institu-
tions are not particularly subject to brand loyalty.
Vaccine research is subject to what economists call a "time consis-
tency" problem. Vaccine research is very expensive, but once vaccines
have been invented, they can usually be manufactured at low cost.6
Once a vaccine has been developed, even a public-spirited government
may be tempted to try to obtain vaccines at a price that would cover
manufacturing costs but not research costs. Governments are in a
strong bargaining position at this point because they are major vaccine
purchasers, they regulate vaccines, and they are arbiters of intellectual
property rights. Governments and international organizations there-
fore can, and do, bargain for very low prices. Thus, while in theory
government purchases of vaccines could make both vaccine producers
and consumers better off, in practice they are often used as a vehicle to
transfer wealth from vaccine producers to consumers.7 Since potential
researchers anticipate this redistribution, they invest less in research
than they otherwise would.48 Kremer
The time-consistency problem that leads governments to pay low
prices for vaccines is exacerbated by political problems in many devel-
oping countries that make vaccines a low political priority In particu-
lar, since vaccines deliver a widely distributed benefit, they tend to
receive less political support than expenditures which benefit more
concentrated and politically organized groups, including salaries for
health workers.
Moreover, vaccine research and development is a global public good,
so each country has an incentive to free ride off research financed by
other countries' governments or induced by their intellectual property
rights protection. A large country, such as the United States, would
know that if it did this, it would risk cutting off the flow of future re-
search. Small countries, such as Uganda, can assume that individually
their actions will have little effect on total research incentives. How-
ever, if all African countries act this way, there will be little incentive for
the development of a malaria vaccine.
This free-riding problem is particularly severe for countries that are
only a small fraction of the world market and hence reap only a small
fraction of the worldwide benefits of research. Pharmaceutical prices
are controlled at prices approximately one half of United States levels
in the European Union, while in Japan, they are controlled at one quar-
ter of U.S. levels (Robbins and Freeman, 1988). The world's three lead-
ing infectious diseases affect many small developing countries that
have even less reason to internalize the benefits of drug development
than the European Union or Japan.8
Historically, developing countries have not provided much protec-
tion for intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals. Until recently,
many developing countries did not grant patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and thereby kept prices low (Siebeck et. al., 1990). Sev-
eral developing countries, including India and Brazil, have recently
agreed to enhance intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals, but
only under intense trade pressure from the United States. It remains to
be seen whether the promised intellectual property rights policies will
be enforced. Many pharmaceutical firms are skeptical. The South Afri-
can government recently announced that it may attempt to force patent
holders on AIDS drugs to license their patents to generic manufactur-
ers. The United States initially opposed this, but abandoned its opposi-
tion in response to a storm of protest. Given the huge importance of an
HIV or malaria vaccine to many developing countries, it is far from
clear that the U.S. could induce developing countries to establishNew Vaccine Markets I: Rationale 49
strong intellectual property rights for such vaccines, short of offering to
pay for the additional costs this would impose on the countries.
Research on vaccines for diseases prevalent in both developed and
developing countries has been stimulated by demand in developed
countries. However, the limited intellectual property rights available in
many poor countries deter research on vaccines against diseases such
as malaria, which would have little market in developed countries.
Note that even if intellectual property rights were enforced globally,
the same arguments that suggest that national vaccine purchases are
more efficient than individual purchases would also suggest that inter-
national purchases are potentially more efficient than national pur-
chases. If vaccine developers charge a single monopoly price to
governments, some countries will not be able to afford to purchase the
vaccine. All countries could potentially be made better off, as long as
the rich countries paid no more than the monopoly price they would
have paid otherwise, and the poor countries pay less than the amount
at which they value the vaccine, but more than the actual production
cost. Note also that even if poor countries could somehow be induced
to establish strong intellectual property rights for vaccine developers,
they would still have market power as purchasers, and hence would
still likely be able to negotiate a price below the full social value of vac-
cines. Hence research and development incentives would likely be too
small even in this case.
The market could reach efficient size if vaccine developers charged
each nation a separate price based on the maximum amount which
they were willing to pay, through a system of tiered pricing. In fact,
pharmaceutical firms do charge different prices to different countries.
However, opportunities for tiered pricing are limited, partly by the
possibility of resale, but primarily by fear of a political backlash in rich
countries. Politically, it is difficult for pharmaceutical firms to justify
charging much higher prices in one country than in another. For exam-
ple, after a Congressional hearing in which Senator Paula Hawkins
asked a major vaccine manufacturer how it could justify charging
nearly three times as much to the United States government for vac-
cines as to foreign countries, U.S. manufacturers stopped submitting
bids to UNICEF to supply vaccines.9
One way to achieve some of the same objectives as tiered pricing
would be to purchase vaccines internationally for a range of poor coun-
tries at a single price and then collect copayments from these countries
that would vary with their incomes. This approach would increase50 Kremer
access to vaccines, while ensuring that richer countries, which have
greater willingness to pay for vaccines, contribute more toward cover-
ing the costs of vaccine research and development. The embarrassment
of charging many different prices to different countries would be
avoided. This approach would, however, require outside funding to
make up the difference between the price at which vaccines are pur-
chased from manufacturers and the copayments received from the
poorest countries.
Social vs. Private Return: Some Quantitative Estimates
A crude preliminary estimate suggests that the social benefits of vac-
cines may be 10 to 20 times the private benefits appropriated by vac-
cine developers. Since potential vaccine developers wifi consider only
private returns in setting their research budgets, incentives for vaccine
research are almost certainly far too small.
Consider the potential benefits from a hypothetical 80% effective
one-dose malaria vaccine. A standard way to assess the cost-effective-
ness of a health intervention is the cost per Disability Adjusted Life
Year (DALY) saved. In its 1993 World Development Report, the World
Bank defined health interventions as "highly cost effective" for poor
countries if they cost less than $100 per DALY saved. (In contrast,
health interventions are considered cost effective in the U.S. at up to
500 to 1000 times this amount$50,000-$100,000 per year of life saved
(Neumann et al. 2000).)
The WHO recently estimated that malaria costs 39.3 million DALYs
per year (WHO, 1999a). Malaria is particularly deadly in children un-
der five, who have not yet developed limited natural immunity and
women pregnant with their first child, whose immune systems are sup-
pressed. The target population for a malaria vaccine would be the
roughly 50 mfflion children born annually in low-income and lower-
middle-income countries with high enough prevalence to make vacci-
nation cost effective and the approximately 10 million women preg-
nant with their first child living in countries with high enough
prevalence to make vaccination of this group cost-effective.10 We as-
sume that 75% of targeted children and 50% of targeted first-time
mothers are reached, so that 42.1 million people are immunized annu-
ally. Incremental delivery costs for adding a single-dose childhood vac-
cine to the EPI package might be about $1.00 per child vaccinated.11 The
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per woman vaccinated. A rough calculation suggests that delivery of
such a vaccine would save 17.6 million DALYs each year and would
cost $52.2 million annually for a delivery cost of about $2.97 per DALY
saved. This implies that at a cost-effectiveness threshold of $100 per
DALY, an 80% effective malaria vaccine would be cost-effective even at
a price of $41 per immunized person, or a totalof $1.73 billion annually
to immunize 42.1 million people.12 Note that these figures do not take
into account knock-on reductions in secondary infections or the poten-
tial economic benefits of reducing malaria prevalence beyond the im-
pact on the individual suffering from the disease.'3 (See Glennerster
and Kremer 2000 for more detailed calculations of vaccine cost-
effectiveness.)
These calculations imply that from the standpoint of society as a
whole, it would be cost effective for private developers to conduct re-
search leading to a malaria vaccine, even if the research were risky and
expensive enough that the developer would have to charge $41 per im-
munized person, or $1.73 billion annually, in perpetuity, to recoup the
research costs and the risk of failure. However, such a research invest-
ment would not be cost-effective from the standpoint of a private de-
veloper. To give some indication of this, the total developing country
market for childhood vaccines is $200 million annually (World Bank
AIDS Vaccine Task Force 2000). The combined cost of the six vaccines
in the standard Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) package is
about $0.50 (Robbins and Freeman, 1988). Of course, a vaccine under
patent would likely generate greater revenues than off-patent vaccines.
However, when the hepatitis B vaccine was first introduced and priced
at $30 per dose, it was used infrequently in developing countries
(Muraskin 1995; Galambos 1995).' Even at a dollar or two per dose,
hepatitis B and Haemophilus influenzae b vaccines do not reach most
children in the poorest countries (General Accounting Office 1999). It
seems likely that the developer of a malaria vaccine would receive pay-
ments worth less than one-tenth or one-twentieth of the $41 per immu-
nized person at which vaccines would be cost-effective. The huge
disparity between private incentives to invest in research and the social
benefits of a vaccine suggests that research investment will be far too
little in the absence of public support.
To summarize, vaccine research is an international public good, since
efforts by one country to develop a malaria vaccine will benefit others
as well. Once vaccines are developed, governments may be tempted
not to compensate vaccine developers for their research expenditures,52 Kremer
so potential developers will not invest in research without credible
commitments that they will be paid. A rough quantitative estimate
suggests that vaccine developers will lack incentives to pursue malaria,
tuberculosis, and HIV vaccine research, even if this research would be
extremely cost effective for society as a whole. These factors suggest
that encouraging vaccine research may be very cost effective relative to
existing forms of development assistance which do not particularly tar-
get global public goods. The next two sections discuss alternative ways
to promote vaccine research.
IV.The Roles of Push and Pull Programs in Encouraging Vaccine
Research
The literature on vaccine research distinguishes between push and
pull programs. Push programs provide funding for vaccine research,
for example through grants to academics, public equity investments
in vaccine development, research and development tax credits, or
work in government laboratories. Pull programs increase rewards
for development of a vaccine, for example by promising to purchase a
vaccine if it is developed. Roughly, the distinction is between pay-
ing for research inputs and paying for research outputs. The first
subsection, titled The Potential Role of Pull Programs, argues that
pull programs are well suited to the later stages of the vaccine develop-
ment process, and discusses some of the problems with push pro-
grams, as illustrated by the history of USAID's push program to
develop a malaria vaccine. The second subsection, titled Combining
Push and Pull Programs, argues that push programs are well suited to
financing basic research, and discusses how push and pull programs
can be combined.
The Potential Role of Pull Programs
Historically,programs designed toencourage vaccine research
financed research inputs ahead of time rather than offering to pay for a
vaccine.15 This may have been in part because there were relatively few
sources of finance for commercial pharmaceutical research outside a
few major pharmaceutical companies. However, the rise of the biotech
industry, the availability of venture capital, and the increased willing-
ness and ability of large pharmaceutical firms to contract with smaller
firms and universities have made it much easier for researchers with
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side investors, as long as a sufficient market is expected for the prod-
uct. Pull programs could create such a market. It is worth reevaluating
methods of supporting research in light of this changed institutional
environment.
Under pull programs the government pays nothing unless a vaccine
is developed. This creates strong incentives for researchers to (1) care-
fully select research projects and (2) focus on developing viable vac-
cines, rather than pursuing other goals.
Perhaps the chief advantage of pull programs that provide strong
financial incentives for production of a vaccine is that they help in se-
lecting research projects. This is true both at the level of selecting indi-
vidual research projects and at the level of determining whether a
major research effort on vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV is
scientifically warranted at all. Researchers working on a particular line
of research have an interest in exaggerating the promise of their own
lines of research. Scientific administrators may have trouble deciding
which diseases are worth working on, and which vaccine approaches,
if any, are worth pursuing. They may wind up financing ideas with
only a minute probability of success, or worse, failing to fund promis-
ing vaccine research because they do not have confidence that its back-
ers are presenting objective information on its prospects.
Public sector equity investments in vaccine development projects are
subject to a similar problem. Firms that believe they have identified
projects with very high expected net present value will be least inclined
to seek public sector investments that would dilute their equity stake,
while those who are least confident about their research prospects will
be most inclined to seek outside equity investment.
Even if government-directed research programs manage to initially
select appropriate research projects, they are likely to fail to revise these
judgments in light of later evidence. If results on a particular research
project that initially appear promising later turn out to be disappoint-
ing, a private firm is likely to shut the project down. A public entity
may acquire its own bureaucratic momentum,leading governments to
throw good money after bad. Public sector institutions are notoriously
difficult to shut down.
The problem of selecting research projects exists not only on the level
of deciding which research avenues toward a particular vaccine are
most promising, but also at the level of deciding whether to expand
vaccine research at all. The previous section on Failures in the Market
for Vaccine Research argued that since vaccines would be cost-effective
at prices much greater than vaccine developers could hope to receive,54 Kremer
private developers would have an incentive to pass up research oppor-
tunities that were cost effective from the standpoint of society as a
whole. This does not prove that such opportunities exist. Elected
officials and the public are likely to find it very difficult to assess the
scientific opportunities for research on malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS
vaccines. Under a system of grant financed research, advocates for par-
ticular diseases and scientists working on the disease have an interest
in exaggerating the opportunities.
While the gap between private and social incentives for vaccine de-
velopment does not prove that socially useful research opportunities
exist, it does suggest a case for bringing private and social incentives
into line, so that private developers will have incentives to pursue any
socially desirable research investments that do exist. A vaccine pur-
chase commitment can do this. Since taxpayers pay nothing unless and
until an effective vaccine is produced, elected officials and the public
do not have to worry that they are investing millions to develop a tech-
nically infeasible vaccine. Government officials do not have to decide
between competing scientific approaches. Pharmaceutical firms con-
templating pursuing a line of research and scientists contemplating
joining biotech ventures in exchange for stock options will invest their
money and time only if they believe the scientific prospects are promis-
ing. Purchase commitments have an advantage over research grants or
equity investments precisely because the scientific potential for vac-
cines is difficult for outsiders to assess.
In addition to allowing researchers to self-select promising projects,
pull programs encourage researchers to focus intently on developing a
marketable vaccine, rather than on other goals. Many academic and
government researchers have career incentives and intellectual inter-
ests that orient them to fundamental science. In contrast, the later, more
applied stages of vaccine development include activities that are not
particularly interesting intellectually, but are expensive. Techniques for
manufacturing sufficient quantities of candidate vaccines in sufficient
purity for clinical trials must be developed. Animal models for the dis-
ease must be created. Vaccine trials in the field must be conducted. No-
body wins a Nobel Prize for these important steps in vaccine
development. By linking payment to results, pull programs provide
strong incentives to researchers to concentrate their efforts on develop-
ment of a vaccine.'6 Under a system of grant financed research, it can be
difficult to monitor that researchers are focusing on development of a
vaccine rather than publishing articles or applying for the next grant.New Vaccine Markets I: Rationale 55
A similar monitoring problem arises when privateresearch is subsi-
dized through targeted R&D tax credits. Currently,U.S. companies are
eligible for a 20% research and development tax credit. Abill recently
introduced in the United States Congress proposes increasingthis
credit to 30% for research on vaccines for diseasesthat kill more than
one million people a year. Onepotential problem with such an ap-
proach is that firms doing research with only indirectimplications for
these diseases might try to claim eligibility for thecredit, while focus-
ing much of their effort on developing morelucrative products.17 In
contrast, a tax credit linked to the sale of avaccine, such as that pro-
posed in President Clinton's 2000 budget, does not face the samemoni-
toring problems. This credit will only beawarded if a marketable
vaccine is produced.
Another problem with push programs is that when governmentsdi-
rectly allocate research spending up front, they sometimesbase deci-
sions on political, rather than scientific,considerations. For example,
there may be pressure to spend funds in particularcongressional dis-
tricts. The analogue for internationally supportedresearch on malaria,
tuberculosis, and HIV is political pressure to allocateresearch expendi-
tures to particular countries, developingcountries in particular. With
pull programs, in contrast, the sponsors promise to payfor a viable
vaccine wherever it is developed.
The risks that grant funded scientists and researchadministrators
competing for budgets will overestimate the chancesof success and di-
vert resources away from vaccineresearch are far from hypothetical.
Desowitz (1991) chronicles the sad story of the U.S. Agencyfor Interna-
tional Development's 1980s push program to develop amalaria vac-
cine. USAID's efforts focused on three teams. Acandidate vaccine was
developed by the first team. Tests with nine volunteers foundthat only
two were protected from malaria, andsuggested that the vaccine cre-
ated side effects. These results, mixed at best, did not preventUSAID
from issuing wildly overoptimistic statements. In1984, the agency
claimed that there had been a "major breakthrough inthe development
of a vaccine against the most deadly form ofmalaria in human beings.
The vaccine should be ready for use around theworld, especially in de-
veloping countries, within five years."18 Fifteen yearslater, the world is
still waiting for a malaria vaccine.
Early work by the second team yielded disappointingresults, but
not surprisingly, the principal investigatorargued that his approach
was still worth pursuingand requested an additional $2.38 million56 Kremer
from USAID. The expert consultants assigned to review the projectrec-
ommended that the research not be funded. However, USAID'sma-
laria vaccine project director told the USAID Office of Procurement that
the expert panel "had endorsed the scientific methodology and theex-
ceptional qualifications and experience of the researchers."19 Once the
grant came through, the principal investigator transferred grant funds
to his personal account. He was later indicted for theft.
The external evaluations of the third proposal called it mediocre and
unrealistic. The USAID project director ignored the report andar-
ranged for the project to be fully funded. The principal investigator
and his administrative assistant were later indicted for theft and crimi-
nal conspiracy in diverting money from the grantto their personal ac-
counts. Two months before his arrest, the Rockefeller Foundation had
provided him with a $750,000 research grant, andon the very day that
he was arrested, USAID announced it was giving himan additional
$1.65 million for research.
By 1986, USAID had spent over $60 million on its malaria vaccine ef-
forts, with little progress. Since USAID believed that there wouldsoon
be many candidate malaria vaccines suitable for testing, it triedto ob-
tain monkeys as test subjects for these vaccines. USAID's malariavac-
cine project director, James Erickson, arranged fora contract to acquire
monkeys to go to an associate who paid him a kickback. Ericksoneven-
tually pleaded guilty to accepting an illegal gratuity, filing falsetax re-
turns, and making false statements.
What about outside oversight? USAID had arranged for independ-
ent oversight to be provided by the American Institute of Biological
Science (AIBS). Erickson and the AIBS-assigned projectmanager were
lovers.
The USAID case is extreme, and many pushprograms are quite suc-
cessful. But the general principle remains that researchers fundedun-
der push programs have incentives to be overoptimistic, and sincethey
are paid before delivering a product, they may be tempted to divertre-
sources away from the search for a vaccine.
The USAID example may shed light on why the administrators of
push programs and the researchers financed by suchprograms often
believe that push programs are somehow cheaper than pullprograms.
As a first approximation, a biotech or pharmaceutical firm will find it
profitable to take on a project if the probability of success times thenet
present value of profits if the project succeeds exceeds the cost ofun-
dertaking the project. This implies that even in the bestcase, if the gov-
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focus all their energies on developing a vaccine, the expected dis-
counted cost of developing a vaccine is likely to be similar in net pres-
ent value terms whether research is financed at the frontend, through
government grants; or induced by payments for a successful vaccine at
the back end.2° In the more likely case, when research organizations are
more careful in selecting projects and morefocused on developing vac-
cines if they are only paid if they succeed, private research is likely to
be more cost-effective than government programs.
Why then do many government scientists argue that push programs
are cheaper than pull programs?The USAID example illustrates that
researchers are prone to underestimate their costs and overestimate
their chance of success. Of course, scientists in pharmaceutical firms do
the same. But pharmaceutical executives and biotech investors antici-
pate this overoptimism, and correct for it by requiringhigh projected
hurdle rates before approving projects or investing funds. The net ef-
fect is that pharmaceutical executives and biotech investors wind up
approving projects that are likely to have positive net presentvalue af-
ter correcting for the overoptimism of project proponents.It is mislead-
ing to compare the amounts government scientists claim theywould
need to develop vaccines with the markets pharmaceutical executives
claim they would need to justify vaccine investments.
The analysis above is theoretical, but it is consistent with the empiri-
cal evidence, which suggests that both government and private R&D
have strong positive returns, but that the rate of return on private R&D
is substantially greater (Nadiri 1993; Nadiri and Mamuneas 1994;and
Bernstein and Nadiri 1988, 1991). The empirical record of government
efforts to pick winners in research and development of commercial
products is littered with failures, from supersonic transport to the
breeder reactor to the Carter oil shale program.
In summary, while the case of USAID's malaria vaccine programis
extreme, and many push programs are effective,push programs in
general are vulnerable to overoptimism and monitoring problems.
With pull programs, in contrast, biotech and pharmaceutical firms
spend their own money on research, and the public pays only if a vac-
cine is produced.
Combining Push and Pull Programs
Although pull programs have an advantage in the later stages of devel-
opment, push programs are likely to be well suited to financingbasic
research. The main objective of basic research, by definition, is to58 Kremer
provide information to other researchers rather than to develop prod-
ucts. A program that ties incentives to the development of a product
would encourage researchers to keep their research results private as
long as possible in order to have an advantage in the next stage ofre-
search. In contrast, grant funded academics and scientists ingovern-
ment laboratories have career incentives to publish their results
quickly. (One way around this would be to link payment to research
output, but it is difficult to measure the quality of basic research. It is
not simply a matter of testing if a vaccine works, or a product sells.)
Push programs also have some attractive features even for later
stages of research. To the extent that intermediate steps in the vaccine
research and development process create spillovers for other research-
ers, it might be worth considering providing milestone payments tied
to these intermediate steps. For example, milestone payments could be
paid if efficacy were demonstrated in animals. However, milestone
payments do not target the ultimate objective of a vaccine, and hence
might stimulate wasteful investments in research lines that were un-
likely to lead to a viable vaccine. For example, researchers might try to
demonstrate efficacy in animal models for a vaccine that was unlikely
to be safe in humans. This problem is greater the larger the milestone
payment; if a milestone payment is greater than the cost of performing
the research, firms might find it profitable to reach the milestone even if
they know they can go no further. Milestone payments will be less
likely to stimulate wasteful research on candidates unlikely to yield a
viable vaccine if they are given in the form of subsidies for future re-
search on the candidate vaccine.
It is not clear whether the same body which administers a vaccine
purchase commitment program should also award milestonepay-
ments. On the one hand, a track record of milestone payments could
help build credibility for a vaccine purchase commitment. On the other
hand, a committee that had supported, or not supported, a line of re-
search through milestone payments might find it difficult to be objec-
tive in assessing eligibility and pricing for a vaccine purchase
commitment.
Push programs have other advantages. Government programs that
pay for research whether it succeeds or fails transfer the risk of failure
from the research firms' shareholders to society at large, and to the ex-
tent that shareholders cannot diversify risk in the stock market, this
risk spreading is a potential advantage of push programs. A number of
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may inefficiently duplicate eachother's activities. A centralized pro-
gram may prevent this. (On the otherhand, while decentralization may
lead to some duplication of effort, it also means that mistakes by a sin-
gle decision maker will not block progress toward a vaccine.)
One of the biggest advantages of push programs relative to pull pro-
grams (other than patents) is that theydo not require specifying the
output ahead of time. A pull program could not have beenused to en-
courage the development of the Post-it Note orthe graphical user inter-
face, because these products could not have been adequatelydescribed
before they were invented. In contrast, it is comparatively easier to
define what is meant by a safe and efficacious vaccine, and existing in-
stitutions, such as the U.S. FDA, are already charged with making these
determinations. As discussed in the companion paper, "Creating Mar-
kets for New Vaccines: Design Issues," even for vaccines,however,
defining eligibility standards is far from trivial.
In general, society seems to prefer to use direct government support
for basic research, while using the promise of an exclusive market,
rather than centralized government programs, to stimulate the applied
work of actual product development. Applying the same principle to
vaccines would suggest using the promise of a market to encourage ap-
plied vaccine research.
Some push programs are already in place to spur vaccineresearch,
although funding is modest. For example, the International AIDS Vac-
cine Initiative (IAVI) supports AIDS vaccine efforts. In contrast, there
are currently no programs in place tofully reward developers of viable
malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV vaccines. If the already existing push pro-
grams were complemented withpull programs, researchers would still
have an incentive to pursue any promising research leads thatslip
through the cracks of the push system.
If vaccine research were supported through a mix of push and pull
programs, push funders could insist on ashare of revenues if a project
they support leads to a vaccine that is rewarded through apull pro-
gram, or could condition publicfinancing on agreement to supply the
vaccine to poor countries at a modest markup overmanufacturing
costs.
V.Alternative Pull Programs
Pull programs that reward successful vaccine research could take sev-
eral different forms other than commitments to purchasevaccines,60 Kremer
including extensions of patent rights on other products, cash prizes,re-
search tournaments, and signaling willingness to pay more for future
vaccines by purchasing more existing vaccines at a higher price.21
Given the huge disparities between private and social returns tore-
search, it is likely that any reasonable program to reward vaccine de-
velopers would be cost-effective relative to the alternative of sticking
with the status quo. However, this section argues that extensions of
patent rights on other pharmaceuticals are not the most efficient way to
reward vaccine developers; that while cash prizes and commitments to
purchase vaccines are economically quite similar, purchase commit-
ments are likely to be somewhat more attractive politically, and thus
more credible to potential vaccine developers; and that research tour-
naments are inappropriate for situations like vaccine development, in
which it is possible that no satisfactory product will be created bya
given date. Purchasing and distributing currently underutilized vac-
cines is certainly justified in its own right, but on its own is unlikely to
convince potential developers of vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis,or
African strains of HIV that the international community will be willing
to pay for these vaccines in 10 or 15 years.
Patent Extensions
Jonathan Mann, the late founding director of the WHO Global Program
on AIDS, suggested compensating the developer of an HIV vaccine
with a 10-year extension of patent rights on another pharmaceutical.
With successful pharmaceuticals bringing in as much as $3.6 billion in
annual sales (CNNfn 1998) such a patent extension would be very
valuable. Patent extensions may be politically appealing to advocates,
in that they need not go through the budget process. However, they
inefficiently and inequitably place the entire burden of financingvac-
cine development on patients in need of the drug for which the patent
has been extended. To see this, note that extending the patent on Prozac
as compensation for developing an HIV vaccine is economically equiv-
alent to imposing a high tax on Prozac and using the proceeds to
finance cash compensation for the HIV vaccine developer. High taxes
on narrow bases are typically an inefficient way of raising revenue,
since they distort consumption away from the taxed good. An exten-
sion of the Prozac patent would prevent some people from getting
needed treatment for depression.
The potential countervailing advantage of patents is that when they
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pensation to the value of the invention, since inventors will be able to
charge more for valuable inventions. If a vaccine is more effective,
causes fewer side effects, and is easier to administer, itwill bring in
more revenue. Patents therefore create appropriate incentivesfor po-
tential inventors. However, rewarding the inventor of an HIV vaccine
with the extension of a Prozac patent eliminates this link between the
usefulness of the invention and the magnitude of the compensation.
Another disadvantage of compensating vaccine inventors with ex-
tensions of patents on unrelated pharmaceuticals is that the right to ex-
tend a patent would be worth the most to firms holding patents on
commercially valuable pharmaceuticals, and these firms may not be
those with the best opportunities for vaccine research. This problem
would not be fully resolved by making patent extensions tradable,
since firms holding patents on commercially valuable pharmaceuticals
would presumably receive some profits in any such trades. If vaccine
developers were compensated in cash, rather than patent extensions,
they could receive the full value of the compensation without sharing it
with the holders of patents on unrelated pharmaceuticals.
Cash Prizes
Cash prizes in lieu of patents are economically similar to purchase
commitments. However, purchase commitments more closely link
payments to vaccine quality and are more politically attractive, and
hence more credible. The disadvantages of government purchases are
likely to be minor for vaccines.
Compared to cash prizes in lieu of patents, vaccine purchases pro-
vide a closer link between payments and vaccine quality. For example,
suppose that a vaccine received regulatoryapproval, but was later
found to have side effects. If a cash prize had been awarded at the date
of regulatory approval, it might be difficult to get the money back. Vac-
cine purchases, on the other hand, could be suspended if countries
wished to cease purchasing vaccines.
Moreover, purchase commitments are likely to be politically more at-
tractive than cash prizes, and thus more credible to potential vaccine
developers. Vaccine developers are vulnerable to expropriation, even if
the terms of the compensation program legally obligate the govern-
ment to provide compensation for any qualifying vaccine: the funds
could be extracted from them in a supposedly separate, unrelated ac-
tion. For example, a pharmaceutical firm that had just earned a wind-
fall on a malaria vaccine might be subject to stiff price regulation on62 Kremer
another product. This suggests that it is important to design a compen-
sation program in ways that are as politically acceptable as possible,
and that generate the minimum amount of resentment. Purchasing ma-
laria vaccine for the 50 million children born in Africa each year at $5 a
dose for 10 years is likely to be more politically appealing than award-
ing a $2.5 billion prize to a pharmaceutical manufacturer. Conversa-
tions with pharmaceutical executives suggest that they do not like
anything labeled as a prize.
Cash prizes in lieu of patents lead to free competition in manufactur-
ing newly invented goods, whereas public purchases require the gov-
ernment to specify details of the goods purchased. This would
represent a significant advantage of prizes over purchases for most
goods, but it is less important for vaccines. For example, if the govern-
ment committed to purchase high definition television sets as a way of
encouraging research, it would have to get involved in decisions about
screen size, color, style, reliability and other issues best left to consum-
ers. In contrast, governments regulate vaccine quality in any case.
Moreover, an effective malaria vaccine would be easy to allocate, since
a single course would presumably be taken by all children in malarious
areas.23
Tournaments
In research tournaments, the sponsor promises a reward to whoever
has progressed the farthest in research by a certain date. (See Taylor
1995 for a discussion of tournaments.) The design competitions often
used to select architectural firms are examples of tournaments. In a vac-
cine tournament, a committee might be established with instructions to
award a cash prize to whichever research team had made the most
progress toward a vaccine as of a specific date. If no vaccine had been
completed by that date, additional funds could be set aside for further
rounds of the tournament.
Tournaments have several limitations, however, and may not be ap-
propriate for encouraging vaccine research.
First, a payment must be made no matter what is developed. While
tournaments provide incentives for researchers to devote effort to de-
veloping a product, they do not address the problem of determining
whether research on a particular vaccine is worth pursuing at all. Ad-
vocates for a particular disease and scientists working on the disease
will always want to encourage the establishment of tournaments for re-
search on their disease, even if the prospects for ultimate success areNew Vaccine Markets I: Rationale 63
low. With a vaccine purchase program, nothing is spent unless a vac-
cine is developed.
Another problem with tournaments is that once research has been
completed, the award committee might be tempted to allocate the re-
ward on grounds other than progress in research. The committee might
award the reward to a more politically correct firm, to a university
team, or to whoever had done the most scientifically interesting work,
rather than to the team which had made the most progress toward a
vaccine. Anticipating this, firms might invest in political correctness or
scientific faddishness rather than in producing an effective vaccine, Of
course, a committee making purchase decisions for a vaccine purchase
program could also be subject to bias, but judgments about who has
made the most progress developing a vaccine are more subjective than
judgments about whether a vaccine with a particular set of results from
phase III trials is satisfactory.
Collusion among potential researchers may be particularly harmful
in tournaments. If only a few pharmaceutical firms had done a
significant amount of work, they could collude to exert low effort on
doing further research, since the reward would be paid whether or not
a vaccine was developed.
Tournaments may lead researchers to put their efforts into looking
good on the tournament completion date, rather than completing a
vaccine. Firms which discovered promising research leads that were
unlikely to yield solid results before the deadline might ignore their
leads, while firms that received information that the research line they
were pursuing would not yield a vaccine might not reveal this
information.
Tournaments are also politically unattractive. Governments may not
find it politically attractive to pay large amounts for research that may
have not progressed very far. Since there would be no clear-cut way to
decide who was ahead in research, awards might be subject to litiga-
tion and charges of favoritism.
Finally, rewards in tournaments would have to be in cash, rather
than in guaranteed sales, since no vaccine may have been developed by
the end of the tournament. As noted earlier, however, cash rewards are
less politically attractive than guaranteed markets.
Expanding the Market for Existing Vaccines
Some argue that by purchasing more existing vaccines at higher prices,
policymakers can signal their intention to provide a market for future64 Kremer
vaccines, and thus encourage research on new vaccines. Although the
standard EPI package of vaccines is widely distributed, a number of ef-
fective vaccines that are already available are not fully used.24 Pur-
chasing and distributing existing vaccines which are not widely used
in developing countries, such as Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib)
vaccine, would be a cost-effective way to save many lives.
However, by itself, paying more for currently available vaccines may
not make pharmaceutical firms confident that they will be rewarded
for developing new vaccines. It could easily take 10 years to develop
malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV vaccines, and developers would need to
recoup their investment through sales in the 10 years following the
vaccines' development. Since international interest in health in devel-
oping countries is fickle, pharmaceutical firms might well feel that the
availability of funds to purchase Hib vaccine now at a remunerative
price does not guarantee that the international community would be
prepared to pay much for future vaccines 15 years from now. Legally
binding commitments to purchase future vaccines at specified prices
would still play a critical role in spurring research.
Moreover, given that the Hib vaccine was developed without any ex-
pectation of realizing substantial profits in developing countries, pay-
ing more than pharmaceutical firms could reasonably have expected
for these vaccines would provide extra profits to pharmaceutical firms.
Providing these extra profits might be worthwhile if it were the only
way to establish a reputation for paying remunerative prices for future
vaccines. Not surprisingly, pharmaceutical manufacturers argue that
the best way to persuade them that work on future vaccines would be
rewarded would be to buy currently available vaccines at a high price.
However, if it were possible to commit now to purchase future vac-
cines at a remunerative price, there would be no reason to pay more for
current vaccines than had been implicitly or explicitly promised to vac-
cine developers. Paying high prices for both current and future vac-
cines as a way of encouraging future research amounts to paying twice.
Finally, some argue that increasing current vaccine sales will increase
vaccine R&D budgets because pharmaceutical firms finance research
on a division by division basis, as a percentage of current sales. It is
possible that some firms might use such a rule of thumb to reduce un-
productive competition for funds among divisions seeking to increase
their R&D budgets. While some pharmaceutical firms may find this
rough rule of thumb useful under the current environment, if the envi-
ronment changes, they will have incentives to change these rules. InNew Vaccine Markets I: Rationale 65
particular, if there is an explicit, credible commitment topurchase vac-
cines, there is reason to think that companieswould change their R&D
budgeting rules. Finally, note that even if some firms areparticularly
subject to wasteful internal budget battles and thereforeimpose draco-
nian internal budget rules, there will be even greaterincentives for
other firms to expand R&D and for new biotech firms to enterthe field
in response to increased markets.
In summary increased purchases and deliveryof existing vaccines
are likely to be very cost-effective waysof saving lives in their own
right. However, in order to motivate R&D on future vaccines,it is nec-
essary to supplement increasedpurchases of existing vaccines with ex-
plicit commitments to reward developers of futurevaccines. Paying
more for existing vaccines thanvaccine developers could have reason-
ably expected when they invested in research islikely to be an expen-
sive way of encouraging research on future vaccines.
VI.Conclusion
This paper has argued that private incentives forresearch on vaccines
for malaria, tuberculosis, and strains of HIV commonin Africa are
likely to be a small fraction of the social value of new vaccines, sothat
under current institutions, potential vaccine developers wouldhave in-
centives to pass up socially valuable research opportunities.Moreover,
if vaccines were developed, access would be limitedif they were sold
at monopoly prices.
Commitments to purchase vaccines and make themavailable to de-
veloping countries for modest copayments could bothprovide incen-
tives for development of vaccines, and ensurethat vaccines reach those
who need them. Taxpayers would pay only if avaccine were
developed.
A companion paper, "Creating Markets for NewVaccines: Part II:
Design Issues," discusses the design of thesevaccine purchase
commitments.
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The vaccine has been much more effective in some trials than others: trialsin Britain
suggest effectiveness up to 80%, while those in the southern United States and southern
India suggest close to zero effectiveness.
Vaccination rates are uneven around the world, but the 74% worldwide vaccination
rate does not just reflect rich country experience: of the 118 million children born each
year, 107 million are born in developing countries.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers may try to sell the vaccine to different customersat dif-
ferent prices. However, the ability of pharmaceutical manufacturers to discriminatebe-
tween customers in this way is limited, because all customers will try to obtain thevac-
cine at the lower price. The government has the power to tax higher incomeearners at a
higher rate. Pharmaceutical manufacturers may come up with crude income indicators,
for example by selling at a discount to groups of hospitals, but they have lessscope to
vary prices with income than the government does to vary taxes with income.
Note that if the willingness to pay for vaccines depends on factors other thanincome,
then tax-financed government vaccine purchases may not make literallyeveryone better
off, because some people may not want to take the vaccine atany price. To see this, it is
useful to consider the cases of malaria and HIV. If a safe, cheap, and effective malaria
vaccine were developed, almost everyone living in areas with malaria wouldpresum-
ably want to purchase it. On the other hand, some people might notwant to take an
AIDS vaccine, even if it were free, because they believe that they havea very low chance
of contracting the disease. Since taxes would presumably fall equallyon people with a
low and a high risk of contracting AIDS, large government purchases ofan AIDS vaccine
might not literally make everyone better off. The willingness of people in low-risk
groups to pay for the vaccine might be less than the increase in their taxes necessary to
pay for vaccine purchases.
As discussed in a companion paper, "Creating Markets for New Vaccines: Part II:De-
sign Issues," government purchase and distribution of products with large development
costs but low manufacturing costs involves its own difficulties. Hence,governments do
not purchase and distribute all such products. However, purchasing vaccines is likely to
be much easier than purchasing other goods, suchas CDs. It is difficult for the govern-
ment to specify what characteristics a CD would need to be eligible for purchase,or how
much to pay CD producers as a function of CD quality. Specifying eligibility andpricing
rules for vaccines is easier, albeit far from trivial.
Note, however, that new vaccines, particularly those based on conjugate technology,
are likely to have somewhat greater manufacturing costs than traditional vaccines.
Large liability awards can also be interpreted as a way that governmentsextract re-
sources from vaccine developers.
Data on the distribution of burden of disease by country is limited, butsome rough
calculations suggest that the share of the worldwide disease burden in the country with
the greatest burden ranges from 14% and 18% for HIV and malaria respectively,which
disproportionately affect Africa, to 25% for tuberculosis, which isa big problem in India.
The share of burden borne by the top four countries is in the 40-50%range.New Vaccine Markets I: Rationale 67
When President Clinton announced his childhood immunization initiative in 1993, he
said, "1 cannot believe that anyone seriously believes that America should manufacture
vaccines for the world, sell them cheaper in foreign countries, and immunize fewer kids
as a percentage of the population than any nation in this hemispherebut Bolivia and
Haiti." [Mitchell, Phiipose, and Sanford, 1993].
Existing cohorts of children younger than five might also be vaccinated, but since
this is a one-time occurrence, it is ignored in this calculation.
The addition of both the hepatitis B and the yellow fever vaccines (which are rela-
tively expensive) to the WHO's Expanded Program of Immunization increased the $15
cost of the program by 15%, or $2.25, including both manufacturing and distribution
costs.
To see this, note that 17.6 million DALYsX$100/DALY = $1.76 billion = $52.2 mil-
lion in delivery costs + $41 per doseX42.1 million doses.
Gallup and Sachs (2000) use a cross-country regression approach to estimate that
countries with severe malaria grew 1.3% less per year than those without malaria. It is
difficult to know the portion of this statistical relationship that is causal.
Even if the entire pharmaceutical budget in many African countries went to malaria
vaccines, the benefit to a vaccine developer would be far less than the social benefit.
Several vaccines were therefore developed primarily in the public sector, and only
later licensed out to the private sector for production. For example, the meningococcal
meningitis vaccine was developed almost entirely at the Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research, and a hepatitis B vaccine was designed by the Hepatitis B Task Force
(Muraskin 1995). However, it is not clear that the development of these vaccines in the
public sector reflects so much the suitability of the public sector for this task as the barri-
ers facing private sector vaccine development.
Of course, to the extent that some of the work required to produce a vaccine is not so
intellectually interesting, scientists will need to be paid more to conduct this work [See
Stern, 20001.
Another problem with the particular form of the research and development tax credit
used in the United States is that it rewards incremental R&D spending, thus creating a
ratchet effect which limits the rewards for sustained high R&D expenditures [Hall, 19931.
From Desowitz 1991, p. 255.
From Desowitz 1991, p. 258.
The cost of capital may be lower for the government than for pharmaceutical firms,
but the difference is not that large.
In a previous paper (Kremer 1998), I discuss the possibility of buying out patents, us-
ing an auction to establish the patent's value. This can be seen as a method of determin-
ing the appropriate cash prize in lieu of a patent. One advantage of this approach is that
it can be used even for inventions such as the Post-It note, which could not be defined
ahead of time and for which it would be very hard to create even a semi-objective proce-
dure for valuing. On the other hand, the auction procedure for valuing patents described
in that paper may be subject to collusion. For products such as vaccines, which are com-
paratively easier to define ahead of time and for which it is comparatively easy to evalu-
ate effectiveness, advance purchase commitments may be just as effective as patent
buyouts, and less subject to collusion.68 Kremer
As Michael Rothchild has pointed out to me, if governments and Health Mainte-
nance Organizations (HMOs) purchase pharmaceuticals, patents may be equivalent to a
broad-based tax. Nonetheless, patents may still be distortionary if HMOs and govern-
ments respond to pharmaceutical prices in their treatment decisions. Governments are
less likely to do so than HMOs, and so patent extensions are more attractive in countries
with centralized health systems.
Note that many people are likely to live in areas where taking the vaccine is a border-
line decision, and even in these areas, the appropriateness of vaccination depends pri-
marily on technical issues rather than personal preferences.
For example, the hepatitis B vaccine is underused. An effective vaccine for malaria or
one of the other major killers would likely be consumed much more widely than the hep-
atitis B vaccine, since the disease burden of hepatitis B is small relative to that of AIDS,
tuberculosis, or malaria. Moreover, malaria kills young children very quickly after infec-
tion and the onset of symptoms, whereas hepatitis B infection can remain asymptomatic
for decades, and many people may not understand its relation to the deaths it causes
from primary hepatic cancer in middle age or beyond.
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